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Abstract 
 
Peruvian average wage profile with respect to schooling is convex. Returns to higher education are 
around nine percentage points larger than returns to basic education. We explore two possible 
explanations for this phenomenon: a composition effect driven by differences in individual ability 
and heterogeneous education quality. We use the theoretical models developed in Card (1994) and 
Card and Krueger (1996) to analyze the effects that individual ability and education quality can have 
on the observed relationship between wages and schooling. We test the implications of these 
models using Peruvian data from a novel survey that includes measures of cognitive skills. We do 
not find evidence of increasing returns by ability. Instead, empirical results are consistent with the 
predictions of a model of endogenous schooling with heterogeneous education quality. Evidence 
suggests that the Peruvian convex wage schedule is the result of two superimposed wage profiles: 
one corresponding to a low quality basic education system and, the other, to a higher education 
system with better quality. Declining education quality at basic and higher education, thus, appear 
to have a role when explaining the “convexification” and recent “deconvexification” of the wage 
profile, respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In Peru, as in several LAC countries, the average wage profile with respect to schooling is 
convex. This phenomenon is not new and has been documented by several authors2. As 
discussed in Binelli (2008), possible explanations for this phenomenon are:  
(i) changes in the market value of education for different educational levels; and  
(ii) changes in the composition by level of education of individual characteristics 
(observable and non-observable) that affect earnings, or changes in their returns.  
 
Within the first explanation we can find stories related to the effect of international trade 
and/or labor market reforms on the demand for skilled labor. For example, skill-biased 
technological change (SBTC) increases the demand for skilled labor causing an increase in 
the wage premium for higher education3. If we focus on the second group of effects, we 
can find explanations related to the role of selectivity and/or financial constraints that limit 
access to higher education, leading to increased relative wages responding to increased 
relative ability in those that access this educational level. 
 
If we focus on the Peruvian “convexification” process, there are two elements worth 
highlighting. First, the “convexification” occurred in the 90s was not only related to an 
increase in the higher education wage premium but also involved a decline in the return to 
basic (primary and secondary) education (see Figure 1). The second element worth noting 
is that since mid-2000s we are witnessing a process of “deconvexification”. This has been 
driven by a decline in the return to higher education (see Figure 1). 
 
In the 90s, Peru underwent a period of significant structural reforms that involved trade 
and financial market liberalizations. This, in principle, makes Peru’s convexification process 
a good candidate to be explained through an increase in the demand for skilled labor due to 
SBTC. However, this story will not accommodate the decline in the return to basic 
education that occurred in the 90s nor the recent decline in the return to higher education, 
especially if we note that Peruvian growth figures have been particularly high during the 
second half of the last decade (around 7% per year). 
 
Access to higher education in Peru is remarkably regressive. Financial constraints have a 
role but also poor basic education quality and poor family environments that prevent 
adequate development of basic skills (Castro, et al., 2011). This fact points towards two 
additional suspects for the evolution of the Peruvian wage profile implicit in Figure 1. The 
first has already been presented and has to do with a composition effect by ability. The 
second suspect has not been directly addressed in the literature as a possible explanation 
for the convexification of the wage profile and has to do with the quality of education.  
 
When we talk about “quality” we refer to an attribute of the education system that affects 
the increase in human capital offered by an additional schooling year within that particular 
system. Within basic education (and especially pre-school and primary education) this 
increase in human capital can be understood as an increase in basic skills or ability. Within 
higher education, the contribution to human capital can be understood as an increase in the 
                                                 
2 See Binelli (2008) and Bourguignon, et al. (2005) for evidence on several LAC countries. See Yamada (2007) 
for specific results on Peru. 
3 Binelli (2008) argues that the convexification process experienced in several LAC countries was a matter of 
changes in the market value of education, but that its main cause was not SBTC but a change in its supply. 
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individual’s proficiency when performing a particular set of tasks related to her career and 
valued in the labor market4. 
 
In this paper, our objective is to provide analytical and empirical evidence to support the 
hypothesis that declining education quality has a role when explaining the 
“convexification” and recent “deconvexification” of the Peruvian wage profile. For this, in 
section 2 we present trends on various indicators that account for the evolution of basic 
and higher education quality in Peru. In what follows, we analyze the implications that 
individual ability and education quality can have on the observed relationship between 
wages and schooling. Section 3 presents this analysis based on the theoretical models 
developed in Card (1994) and Card and Krueger (1996). In section 4, we use the results of 
a novel survey that includes special tests to measure cognitive skills to test these 
implications. Section 5 summarizes our main conclusions. 
 
 
2. Trends on education quality in Peru 
 
It is customary to refer to learning outcomes when documenting basic education quality 
(see, for example, Hanushek and Wöbmann, 2007). Learning outcomes are measured 
through standardized literacy and numeracy tests and their results depend on individuals’ 
basic skills. 
 
A cross-country comparison using the latest results provided by the Program for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) evaluation provides strong evidence to support 
the fact that basic education quality in Peru is very poor. PISA evaluations are applied to a 
nationally representative sample of 15 year-olds, comprise three areas (reading 
comprehension, mathematics, and science) and their results are classified in six levels. 
Students scoring in level 2 or above can be considered to have “passed” the evaluation. As 
shown in Figure 2, little more than a third of Peruvian 15-year olds exhibit adequate 
reading comprehension skills, while only 26% show adequate mathematical skills according 
to PISA standards. These results place Peru among the bottom three (out of 65 countries). 
Countries in the top three, on the other hand, produce results where more than 90% of 
their youngsters exhibit adequate reading comprehension and mathematical skills. 
 
National evaluations performed on second grade students (7-9 year olds) reveal even worse 
results. In the 2010 evaluation, only 29% and 14% of students were able to demonstrate 
adequate reading comprehension and mathematical skills, respectively. Although the recent 
trend evidences an improvement (back in 2007 the above percentages were 16% and 7%), 
this does not suffice to claim that basic education quality problems in Peru have been 
abated.  
 
The evidence presented above is consistent with the presence of a low quality basic 
education system. If it is true that quality has a role when explaining the slope of the wage 
profile, this evidence suggests that there are little prospects of recovery, at least in the near 
future, from the diminished return that basic education has exhibited throughout the last 
decade (see Figure 1). The above statistics, however, say nothing about the decline 
                                                 
4 Basic skills comprise cognitive (e.g., literacy, numeracy, problem-solving) and non-cognitive (e.g., self-
discipline, perseverance, dependability) abilities. There is consensus that the first are well set by the age of 10, 
while the latter remain malleable during adolescent years (Cunha and Heckman, 2008). Individual’s 
proficiency when performing a particular set of tasks related to her career can also be referred to as 
professional skills. 
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experienced between mid-80s and late 90s. To document relevant basic education quality 
affecting returns between those years we would require test results back from the 70s5. 
Unfortunately these are not available. The oldest PISA evaluation in which Peru 
participated dates from year 2000 while the oldest national student evaluation which allows 
assessment in absolute terms was performed in 2001. Results in these evaluations confirm 
that poor basic education quality has been the norm during the last 10 years and are 
consistent with the persistently low return exhibited by this educational level during the 
same period6. 
 
It is possible, however, to present indirect evidence of the declining quality of the basic 
education system between the 70s and early 80s. Starting in the 1970s, and due to 
demographical pressure, the Peruvian government decided to split full time school 
schedules in public schools into a morning-shift (from 8 am to 1 pm) for part of the 
students and an afternoon-shift (from 1 to 6 pm) for the rest of students (Yamada, 2008). 
This decision allowed a significant increase in enrolment rates, especially in secondary 
education. Between 1970 and 1980, gross enrolment in secondary education grew from 
30% to 60% (Cotlear, 2006). However, it also implied an actual reduction of teaching and 
learning time by a full third, which materialized through a significant decline in government 
spending per student. In fact, spending per student fell by 36% between 1975 and 1985, 
and has only recently recovered its 1970s level. As shown in Figure 3, the reduction in 
spending per student occurred between 1975 and 1985 was followed by a sharp decline in 
the return to basic education during the subsequent 15 years (1985-2000). 
 
Accounting for the evolution of higher education quality is a much more difficult task due 
to the lack of consensus regarding its concept and measurement (see Harvey and Green, 
1993). If we recall our definition of quality, our aim should be to account for the evolution 
of those elements that can influence the contribution that an additional year of higher 
education has on individuals’ professional skills. Also, consistent with the decline in the 
return to higher education occurring since mid-2000s (see Figure 1) and our main 
hypothesis, we need to document this evolution starting in the late 90s. 
 
Interestingly, this period coincides with an important shift in terms of incentives for higher 
education providers. In 1996, using special legislative powers granted by Congress, the 
Peruvian government passed a law (Legislative Decree 882) to promote private investment 
in education. This decree allowed private schools and universities to operate under the 
same rules as a private business. There are no reasons to suspect that private investment, 
per se, should hinder higher education quality. However, there is a large risk that a profit 
maximizing initiative will end up overlooking educational outcomes if it is not 
accompanied by strong regulation. A profit maximizing college faces powerful incentives to 
maximize enrollment in the short run and keep fixed costs as low as possible. Once fixed 
costs have been covered, an additional student translates almost entirely into profit. 
 
Throughout the last decade, these incentives have been accompanied by a significant 
increase in higher education demand (real per capita GDP grew 53% between 2000 and 
2010, making financial constraints less binding for higher education access) and the 
                                                 
5 Test results refer to the student population while returns to schooling are estimated comparing wages of the 
entire workforce with different schooling levels. It is reasonable to wait at least a decade for a change in skills 
in the student population to transpire into a change in mean wages in the labor market.  
6 In the 2000 PISA evaluation, only 20% of 15 year-old Peruvians passed the reading comprehension test. In 
the 2001 national evaluation only 18% and 22% of fourth grade students exhibited sufficient communications 
and mathematical skills, respectively. 
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absence of quality assurance mechanisms. In fact, Peru lacks as a comprehensive and 
enforceable evaluation to authorize the creation of new universities and an accreditation 
system to guarantee continuous monitoring and quality control7.     
 
All the above has promoted a surge in the supply of private universities: in the period 1996-
2010, the number of private universities grew from 29 to 65 while the participation of this 
type of institutions in total enrollment raised from 40% to 60%. This growth in private 
supply has aided in coping with demographic pressure and has allowed an important 
increase in university higher education enrollment. Private universities created between 
1996 and 2010 currently accommodate 134,370 students, which represent 17% of the total 
university student population. Unfortunately, it has also fueled three results that conspire 
against university education quality as defined above.  
 
First, it has provoked a decline in selectivity: the average admissions ratio (the number of 
admitted students divided by the number of applicants) has raised from 0.30 in 1996 to 
0.45 in 2009. In a country with poor basic education learning outcomes, this implies a 
decline in the stock of basic skills of the average college student8. 
 
Second, it has implied a shift in the faculty composition towards more part-time lecturers 
and less full time professors: the participation of full time professors in university 
education fell from 47% in 1996 to 35% in 2010. Currently, full time professors represent 
68% of total faculty in public universities; in private universities this ratio is only 17%. This 
trend implies a decline in research activity per student and has an effect on the analytical 
content of courses and lectures. 
  
And, third, it has promoted a career composition that does not necessarily respond to the 
demands of the labor market but rather to interest in short term profit. It is remarkable 
that professional underemployment has remained above 30% in the past five years despite 
Peruvian record-breaking growth figures (see Figure 4)9. In fact, new higher education 
institutions face strong incentives to offer popular programs that do not entail major 
investments in infrastructure or equipment, with no particular concerns on their potential 
labor market outcomes. For example, careers related to Economics and Business are 
currently within the most popular among high school graduates (they account for 27% of 
total university enrollment). Not surprisingly, 70% of private universities created between 
                                                 
7 In Peru, the operation of a new university must be authorized by the Consejo Nacional para la Autorizacion 
de Funcionamiento de Universidades (CONAFU) which is part of the National Assembly of Rectors 
(Asamblea Nacional de Rectores - ANR). Currently, however, more than 40% of private universities operate 
with a “provisional” authorization (meaning that some of the official requirements are still pending) while 
many regional subsidiaries operate without any official permit. The National System for the Evaluation, 
Accreditation and Certification of Education Quality (SINEACE) was created by law in 2006. However, the 
higher education accreditation process has formally started only a couple of years ago. As for today, 
accreditation is only mandatory for health and education related careers, no university program has completed 
the accreditation process, and only 10 universities have started their external evaluation. 
8 Measures of cognitive ability obtained from the urban working-age population (to be used in the empirical 
analysis below) reveal that university graduates who attended college before year 2000 have more cognitive 
ability than those who attended college after this year (the former score, on average, 0.2 standard deviations 
more than the latter). 
9 Following Clogg and Shockey (1984), professional underemployment can be estimated considering 
university graduates who are overeducated according to the schooling standard in their occupation. In 
particular, university graduates are underemployed if their educational attainment is above the mean schooling 
in their respective occupation, plus one standard deviation. Estimates using the 2010 ENAHO show that 
35% of university graduates between 24 and 45 years of age are currently underemployed. This figure was 
29% back in 2004. Between these years, GDP grew at an annual average rate of 7.1%, 
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1996 and 2009 offer at least one program in this area. At the same time, a third of 
underemployed professionals have graduated from these careers10. 
 
 
3. Ability, education quality, and the returns to schooling 
 
3.1 Ability and increasing returns to education 
 
Card (1994) provides a simple theoretical framework to understand the potential effects of 
ability on schooling decisions and their implications for the estimation of the effect of 
schooling on log-wages.  
 
We can assume individual   chooses schooling to maximize utility given by: 
 
 (     )     (  )   (  )     (1) 
  
Where    represents earnings,    are years of schooling, and  ( ) is a convex cost function.  
The first order condition satisfied by the optimal number of schooling years (   ) is given 
by: 
    (  )
   
   (  ) 
     (2) 
 
Following Card (1994), we can further assume that the marginal return and cost are linear 
functions of schooling with individual specific intercepts.  
 
    (  )
   
    ( )        
  (  )     ( )        
(3) 
 
Note that, for each individual, schooling exhibits diminishing marginal returns.  The 
optimal number of schooling years is given by: 
 
    
     
(   )
 
(4) 
 
According to this simple model, cross sectional variability in schooling choices arises from 
differences in ability (  ) and marginal discount rates for schooling (  ). Differences in 
discount rates are determined by differences in access to funds and preferences for 
education. 
 
The log-wage equation implicit in   ( ) is given by: 
 
   (  )         (   )  
 
 
                                                 
10 Professionals in Business and Economics currently represent 20% of the total number of 24-45 year old 
university graduates in the workforce. Underemployed professionals graduated from Business and 
Economics, however, represent 33% of total number of underemployed 24-45 year old university graduates.  
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(5) 
 
An important implication of this is that the data can present us with a convex relation 
between log-earnings and schooling because the latter is positively correlated with ability 
and ability also affects the slope of the log-earnings equation.  In fact, in a simple Mincerian 
equation relating log-wages to schooling, our estimate of the marginal effect of schooling 
would be an estimate for    ( ) which, as specified in (3), is positively affected by ability 
and negatively affected by schooling. 
 
The convexity of the cross-sectional relation between log-wages and schooling will depend 
on the variance of ability relative to the variance of marginal costs or discount rates11 (Card, 
1994). Fixing    and shifting the marginal cost (  ) will produce a concave relation. On the 
other hand, fixing the marginal cost and shifting ability will produce a convex relation (see 
Figure 5, panels (A) and (B), respectively). 
 
Increased ability accompanied by increased returns to education is one of the possible 
explanations invoked in the first section to account for the “convexification” of the wage 
profile. More able people choose more schooling, so more schooling is accompanied by a 
larger return in the data: the return observed for higher education corresponds to the 
return to schooling for more able people which is larger. This story is consistent with the 
equilibrium outcomes shown in panel (B) of Figure 5. 
 
The above analysis, however, ignores potential correlation between    and   . There are 
several reasons to suspect a negative correlation between ability and marginal costs. More 
educated parents lead richer families and have stronger preferences for education (which 
lowers   ) while having higher ability (and this raises    to the extent in which ability is 
inherited or influenced by family background). Psychic costs of education (related to the 
marginal disutility of schooling) are also smaller for more able individuals. 
 
Nordin and Rooth (2008) exploit the implications of this negative correlation between 
ability and costs to explain why returns to schooling are increasing by ability in Sweden but 
not in the US. They argue that the Swedish higher education system is heavily subsidized 
and exhibits weak credit constraints. This lowers the correlation between     and     it is no 
longer true that schooling costs are particularly large for less affluent families and, thus, for 
less able individuals. This setting is consistent with a convex wage profile and, in a 
regression of log-earnings on schooling interacted with ability, returns should be larger for 
high ability groups.  
 
Nordin and Rooth (2008) find this type of evidence using Swedish data. They fail, however, 
to find a similar pattern for the US and claim this is due to stronger credit constraints and 
more rigorous selection process for higher education leading to stronger correlation 
between ability and marginal costs of schooling. Panel (C) of Figure 2 depicts this type of 
result: if correlation between ability and costs is large, raising ability will not necessarily 
imply increasing returns. These equilibrium outcomes are not consistent with a convex 
wage profile. 
 
 
3.2 Education quality and increasing returns to education 
                                                 
11 Interaction (and compensation) of both effects is what would be behind the linear relationship usually 
documented using US data (Card, 1994). 
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The notion of education “quality” has not been directly addressed in the literature as an 
explanation for observed increasing higher education wage premium or the 
“convexification”12 of the wage profile13. As discussed in Card and Krueger (1996), more 
school quality should lead to a larger marginal return for each additional year of schooling. 
Changes in quality at different educational levels, thus, should provoke changes in the wage 
profile and could be in part responsible of its “convexification”.  
 
This explanation can be classified within the second driver discussed in the first section and 
could be regarded as a “supply-side” effect. It has to do with the characteristics of the labor 
force, not with its number or composition by age, experience or ability, but with its 
composition according to the productivity shift provided by the educational level attended. 
 
In the absence of demand-side shocks such as SBTC14 and with a constant supply of labor, 
a decline in the quality of education at a particular level (which comprises a certain number 
of schooling years) will reduce the proficiency gain offered by that level when performing 
certain tasks priced in the labor market. Note that in a general equilibrium setting, this type 
of shock is different from a SBTC in that there are no changes in the production function 
of goods (as in SBTC) but in the production function of human capital15. The final effect, 
however, can be equivalent. A smaller contribution to output of an additional unit of 
human capital (for a completed educational level) or a smaller contribution to human 
capital of an additional year of schooling (within the same educational level), both should 
reduce the wage increase related to an additional year of schooling within that same 
educational level. 
  
We can use the simple model proposed in Card and Krueger (1996) to formalize the role of 
education quality on schooling decisions and further explore its implications for the 
empirical relation between log-wages and schooling. We can start with the same basic 
formulation summarized in equations (1) and (2) above, but will change the specification 
for the marginal return to schooling  to allow for a specific role for quality. For this, 
assume that log-earnings for individual   attending schooling system   are determined by: 
 
   (   )               
(5) 
 
Note that ability    now affects the intercept of the earnings function while “school 
quality” is expressed in   ; i.e. the marginal productivity offered by schooling system  . 
This linear specification for log-wages with no person-specific components in its slope 
                                                 
12 Notice that the “convexification” of the wage profile is not the same as an increasing higher education 
wage premium. The latter implies “convexification” but the opposite is not true. “Convexification” can also 
be caused by a decline in the return to basic education. 
13 Binelli (2008) invokes poor basic education quality as a potential reason to explain why relaxation of credit 
constraints were not enough to allow increased supply at the intermediate level to translate into a 
proportional increase at higher education (thus preventing a decline in wages for higher education and leading 
to the “convexification” of the wage profile). Poor basic education quality, however, was not acknowledged 
as a direct cause of the “convexification”. 
14 SBTC can be modeled as a permanent increase in the contribution of skilled labor in the composition of 
human capital. An increase in this contribution can be interpreted as an increase in the productivity or in the 
demand for skilled labor (Binelly, 2008). 
15 It is not that an additional unit of a certain form of human capital (say, unskilled) now increases output in a 
smaller amount (as in SBTC). It is that an additional unit of time devoted by the household in human capital 
accumulation increases human capital in a smaller amount. 
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implies a constant marginal return to education which depends solely on the education 
system attended:       . If we retain the same specification for the marginal cost of 
schooling as in (3), the first order condition for the optimal number of schooling years 
implies that: 
 
     
     
 
 
(6) 
 
Note that all cross sectional variation within the same educational system is given by 
differences in schooling costs. This model has two important implications for the 
possibility of observing a convex wage profile. First, the data will present us a convex wage 
profile if quality is increasing with schooling. The second implication has to do with the 
effect of quality on earnings conditional on schooling. In particular, with the fact that more 
school quality does not necessarily imply higher earnings for low levels of education.  
 
Let us briefly develop this last point following the analysis of Card and Krueger (1996) 
since it heavily depends on the very same fact that prevents the framework developed in 
the previous section from delivering a convex wage profile: negative correlation between 
ability and schooling costs. Denote the theoretical regression coefficient of ability on 
discount rates as     
   (     )
   (  )
. Using the expression for the marginal cost of schooling 
given in (3) and the first order condition for the optimal number of schooling years, we can 
express the conditional expectation of ability given observed schooling and quality as: 
 
 (  |      )       (  ) 
                             (       ) 
 
(7) 
 
Expected ability within the same educational system and for a given number of schooling 
years is clearly decreasing in quality if      . Reasons to suspect a negative correlation 
between ability and schooling costs have already been discussed in the previous section.  
To see the implications for the wage schedule, consider that the population regression 
function that relates log-wages to schooling can be expressed as: 
 
 *   (   )|      +   (  |      )        
                                             (       )    
(8) 
 
Clearly, if      , an increase in quality (  )  raises the slope and lowers the intercept if 
the wage schedule, so that more quality does not necessarily imply higher earnings (see 
Figure 3). 
 
 
4. Increasing ability or declining quality?: empirical results for Peru 
 
From the discussion above is clear we have two competing explanations for the potential 
composition effects that are behind the “convexification” of the wage profile. The first 
composition effect has to do with ability: increasing ability raises the return to education 
and the optimal number of schooling years. The equilibrium outcomes observed in the 
12 
 
data, thus, correspond to larger returns for the more educated. As discussed above, 
however, this explanation requires weak correlation between ability and schooling costs.  
 
Another explanation has to do with quality. If the higher education system exhibits (on 
average) more quality than the basic education system, the wage profile related to higher 
education should have a more pronounced slope. In addition, endogenous schooling 
decisions would imply that equilibrium outcomes observed in the data are consistent with a 
lower intercept for the higher education wage schedule. As opposed to the ability 
composition effect, this result requires a strong negative correlation between ability and 
schooling costs.  
 
The importance of family income, ability, and family background for higher education 
access in Peru (Castro, et al., 2011), suggests a strong negative correlation between ability 
and schooling costs. If credit and skill constraints are in place for higher education 
enrolment, it is clear that schooling costs are larger for less able individuals16. This implies 
that, at least theoretically, increasing ability accompanying more schooling does not appear 
as a convincing explanation for a convex wage profile. Increasing education quality 
accompanying more schooling years, however, still holds as a possible explanation. 
 
In what follows we present empirical evidence in support of the above. For this, we use the 
results from a novel survey developed specifically to explore the relationship between labor 
outcomes, education and skills in Peru (ENHAB 2010). This data comes from a random 
sample of the working-age (14-50) urban population. The survey includes a battery of tests 
specially designed to measure cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills or personality traits. 
On the cognitive side, the survey includes the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, and tests 
of verbal fluency, working memory, and numeracy/problem-solving. All four measures 
were aggregated into a single measure of “cognitive skill” (Cueto, et al., 2010). 
 
Results shown in column (A) of Table 1 correspond to a simple model to account for a 
convex wage profile. The regression takes the form: 
 
 
   (  )                     
      
(9) 
 
Where    are individual   schooling years and    is an indicator variable reflecting if the 
individual attended higher education. Return to basic education (the percent wage increase 
for each additional schooling year) is given by   while higher education return is given by 
   . Additionally, we allow for an intercept shift in the higher education wage profile 
given by  . Note that if      and    , basic and higher education wage profiles will be 
consistent with the low and high quality wage schedules depicted in Figure 3, respectively. 
 
Before describing the rest of the empirical specifications used for Table 1, it is worth 
noticing that (9) corresponds to the unrestricted version of: 
 
   (  )                   
          (10) 
 
                                                 
16 Even if only credit constraints were binding, the negative correlation between schooling costs and ability 
would still hold to the extent in which less affluent families face larger credit constraints and, at the same 
time, are unable to provide adequate environments (both at home and at school) for the formation of basic 
skills. 
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Where     and     are the number of schooling years in basic and higher education of 
individual  , respectively. In this specification,    will capture the return to basic education 
while    the return to higher education. Note, in addition, that  
            and that the maximum number of schooling years in basic education in 
Peru is 11. Therefore, if the individual has attended higher education (    ),  
          and       . If she has not attended higher education (    ), then 
      and       . This implies that (10) can be rewritten as: 
 
 
   (  )       (  (    )      )      (     )    
      
                        (     )     (     )       
      
(11) 
 
This is a restricted version of (9) where we have imposed       . In terms of Figure 3, 
this restriction is related to the number of schooling years for which the high and low 
quality wage schedules cross. Regressing (9) implies allowing the data to indicate this 
crossing point. Thus, if we cannot reject the restriction         in (9) it would mean 
that that the return shift occurs in year 11 which is, precisely, the number of years it takes 
to complete basic education.  
 
Column (B) in Table 1 shows the results of a regression of log-wages on schooling 
interacted with ability. The potential effect of ability on the return to schooling is captured 
with four dummy variables that indicate the individual’s ability group (                ). 
According to (12) below, the return to schooling for an individual belonging to ability 
group   is given by   
17. Ability groups were built using cognitive tests score quartiles from 
the ENHAB distribution. 
 
   (  )     ∑        
 
    ∑      
 
      
        (12) 
 
For column (C) we extend (12) to include schooling and variables      and    used in (9)
18. 
It is a mixed model that allows for increasing returns by ability and by schooling.  
In column (D), we drop the interactions between ability and schooling and allow ability to 
affect only the intercept of log-wages. Finally, columns (E) and (F) show results for the 
basic model given in (9) using the subsample of individuals who attended basic education 
in the capital city (Lima) and outside Lima, respectively. 
 
Several results are worth highlighting from Table 1. First, column (A) confirms that returns 
to higher education are significantly larger than returns for basic education (around 9 
percentage points larger)19. In addition, the projection of the higher education wage profile 
                                                 
17 This specification is similar to that used in Nordin and Rooth (2008) to evaluate the hypothesis of 
increasing returns to schooling by ability. 
18 Note that we need to drop one of the interactions with the ability group. 
19 These results are consistent with returns estimated using the ENAHO 2010 survey shown in Figure 1. In 
Appendix 1 we present results for this same specification using data from the 1991 ENNIV (Encuesta Nacional 
de Niveles de Vida) and the 2004 and 2010 ENAHOs. We also simulate the average wage schedule for each 
year using coefficient estimates obtained for schooling years (  ) , schooling years if attended higher 
education (    ), and the higher education indicator variable (  ). Consistent with a decline in basic education 
quality, “convexification” occurred between 1991 and 2000 was in part driven by a decline in the slope of the 
basic education wage schedule, accompanied by a lower intercept for the higher education schedule. 
“Deconvexification” occurred between 2004 and 2010, on the other hand, occurred through a decline in the 
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has a lower intercept and it is not possible to reject that       . This implies that the 
basic and higher education wage schedules are consistent with Figure 3, with a cross-over 
point equal to the number of schooling years in basic education.  
 
Second, results presented in column (B) do not show evidence of increasing returns by 
ability across the entire ability distribution. While it is true that moving from the first to the 
third skill quartile raises the return to schooling around 9 percentage points, shifting from 
the third to the upper quartile implies even a slight decline. Consistent with strong 
correlation between ability and marginal costs of education, moving up from the first to the 
third quartile of the cognitive skill distribution involves a significant increase in average 
schooling. Moving from ability group 1 to ability group 3 implies raising higher education 
access from 8% to nearly 45%. This ability boost captures a shift from basic to higher 
education and, thus, the return increase is similar to that shown in column (A) for variable 
    . This is not at odds with our hypothesis: the return boost we observe in column (B) 
can be due to a quality shift and not an ability shift. The fact that moving up from ability 
group 3 to 4 does not imply an increase in the return to schooling contributes to this 
explanation. In fact, once the quality threshold has been crossed, additional ability will still 
imply more schooling20 but not larger returns. 
 
What happens if we control for the educational level attended? This involves introducing 
variables      and    back into the regression. When doing so, all ability group variables 
lose significance (see column (C)). If we compare results in column (A) and (C), we will 
note that the higher education indicator variable is robust to the possibility of increasing 
returns by ability: the return to higher education is larger but this is not because the return 
for more able people is larger21.  
 
According to the model with heterogeneous education quality described in section 3.2, 
ability should have a role when explaining log-wages. Holding quality constant, more ability 
should induce more schooling because skill is correlated with lower schooling costs. 
Holding quality and schooling constant, more ability should imply larger salaries. This last 
effect is captured in column (D): belonging to the upper quartile of the skill distribution 
implies almost a 22% increase in hourly wages. 
 
Finally, results shown in columns (E) and (F) are also revealing. First, one should consider 
that there is a significant learning outcome gap in favor of schools in Lima vs. schools in 
the rest of the urban domain22. In column (E) we identify schooling returns for those 
individuals who attended basic education in Lima with the objective of isolating a high 
quality system within basic education. If this mitigates the convexity of the wage profile, it 
would provide additional evidence suggesting that quality has a role explaining this 
                                                                                                                                               
slope and an increase in the intercept of the higher education wage schedule. Both are consistent with a 
decline in the quality of higher education. 
20 Moving up from the third to the upper quartile of the skill distribution further increases higher education 
access in 30 percentage points. 
21 In Appendix 2 we provide results using the distribution of scores obtained for a non-cognitive skill related 
to individuals’ perseverance or grit (Duckworth, et al., 2007). As in column (C) from Table 1, the existence of 
larger returns to schooling for those who attended higher education is robust to the inclusion of ability group 
indicators.  There is, however, evidence that grit affects the return to schooling. This is not at odds with our 
analytical discussion. Results provided in Castro, et al. (2011) show that grit has a smaller effect than cognitive 
ability on higher education access, while evidence discussed in this study suggest a weak correlation between 
grit and the marginal cost of schooling.   
22 The difference in learning outcomes for both mathematics and communication skills between schools in 
Lima and the rest of the urban domain is now around 0.5 standard deviations. If the gap was different in the 
past decades, larger economic centralism only points towards an even bigger difference. 
15 
 
phenomenon. Results show that variables      and    lose significance for the subsample 
of individuals who attended basic education in the capital city (see column E). Also, the 
convexity of the wage profile is much more pronounced within the low quality basic 
education system (see column (F) for outside Lima). 
 
 
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
 
This paper has explored two possible explanations for the convexity of the average wage 
profile with respect to schooling observed in Peruvian data. The first is a composition 
effect driven by differences individual ability: we observe increasing returns to education 
because larger ability implies larger returns and more able people choose more schooling. 
The second explanation involves heterogeneous education quality: returns to higher 
education are larger because this system exhibits more quality than basic education. 
 
We have defined quality as an attribute of the education system that affects the increase in 
human capital offered by an additional schooling year within the system. To motivate its 
role when explaining the convexity of the wage profile, we have documented trends on 
several indicators that can be directly or indirectly related to the outcomes of basic and 
higher education. These trends suggest that: (i) education quality in basic education is 
currently very poor; (ii) decline in basic education quality can be traced back to the 1970s; 
and (iii) education quality in higher education has deteriorated in the last 10 years. If we 
relate schooling returns to education quality, this evidence appears consistent with the 
“convexification” of the wage profile observed since mid 80s and throughout the 90s, and 
the “deconvexification” verified since the second half of the 2000s.  
 
To formalize our discussion, we have revisited the models developed in Card (1994) and 
Card and Krueger (1996). These models explain how endogenous schooling decisions can 
affect the observed relationship between schooling and wages under increasing returns by 
individual ability and education quality, respectively. An important difference between both 
models is that the first will deliver a convex relationship between log-wages and schooling 
if the correlation between individual ability and the marginal cost of schooling is low. The 
second model, on the other hand, predicts a larger slope and a lower intercept for a high 
quality education system under a strong negative correlation between skill and schooling 
costs. This prediction is consistent with a convex average wage schedule if we postulate 
that the high quality system corresponds to higher education. 
 
The significance of credit constraints, skill and family background for higher education 
access in Peru implies a strong negative correlation between ability and schooling costs. 
Thus, at least theoretically, this advocates for heterogeneous education quality when 
explaining the convexity of the wage profile. 
 
We have tested the implications of both models using data from a novel survey that 
includes measures of cognitive ability for the urban working-age population. After 
controlling for the educational level attended, we found no evidence of increasing returns 
by ability. Instead, we found a wage schedule for higher education which robustly 
conforms to the predictions of the model with heterogeneous education quality. Finally, we 
tried to isolate a high quality education system within basic education using data from 
individuals who attended this educational level in the capital city.   Homogenizing 
education quality should mitigate the convexity of the wage profile if education quality has 
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a role when explaining this phenomenon. Consistent with this, we could not find evidence 
of a convex wage profile using the proposed subsample of individuals. 
 
The exploration and results summarized above provide both analytical and empirical 
evidence that point towards the fact that the Peruvian convex wage schedule is the result of 
two superimposed wage profiles: one corresponding to a low quality basic education 
system and, the other, to a higher education system with better quality. Declining education 
quality at basic and higher education, thus, appear to have a role when explaining the 
“convexification” and recent “deconvexification” of the wage profile, respectively. 
 
An important implication of these findings is related to role that wage dynamics are 
currently playing in the reduction of income inequality in Peru. The Gini coefficient 
measured using household income has decreased nearly 9% during the second  
half of the 2000s. While a rigorous decomposition of this reduction is pending, labor 
income has surely played a role. Consistent with the “deconvexification” of the wage 
profile documented here, during this same period, real wages for skilled labor have raised 
significantly less than wages for unskilled labor (12% vs. 25%, respectively). This 
contributes to the reduction of the income gap between rich and poor families which, in 
principle, could be regarded as desirable. Our enthusiasm about this result, however, 
should be tamed if we learn that it is in part due to a reduction in the quality of higher 
education, especially if we suspect that this can have a negative effect on long term growth. 
 
Additional enquiry on the implications of the decline in education quality is beyond the 
scope of this paper and makes a good candidate for further research. Another potential 
topic has to do with the role of non-cognitive skills. We have presented and discussed 
preliminary evidence regarding their effect on the return to schooling and hope to motivate 
additional exploration on the matter. 
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Figure 1 
Returns to basic and higher education in Peru /1 
 
/1 Returns correspond to OLS coefficient in a regression of log-hourly wages on schooling years. 
Returns to higher education were differentiated with a dummy variable indicating if schooling years 
correspond to higher education (> 11). All regressions control for experience and its square, sex and 
capital city. Dotted lines indicate 95% confidence interval. Databases used were ENNIV surveys for 
1985-1997 period and ENAHO surveys for 2000-2010 period. 
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Figure 2 
2009 PISA evaluation results  
(% of total population in each level) 
 
(A) Reading comprehension 
 
 
(B) Mathematics 
 
 
                Source: OECD PISA 2009 database. 
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Figure 3 
Public expenditure per-student in basic education 
and the return to basic education 
 
       Source: UNESCO and calculations presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 4 
Underemployed university graduates  
(% underemployed among 24-45 year old university graduates in the workforce) 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Clogg and Shockey (1984). University graduates are 
underemployed if their educational attainment is above the mean schooling in their respective 
occupation, plus one standard deviation. 
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Figure 5 
Possible equilibrium outcomes for different marginal costs  
and marginal rate of return to schooling 
 
(A) (B) 
 
 
 
(C)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
Effects of raising quality on the wage schedule 
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Table 1 
 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Schooling (  ) 0.037* - 0.021 0.029 0.062*** 0.033*** 
Schooling if higher education 
(    ) 
0.090** - 0.085* 0.091** 0.078 0.144*** 
Higher education (  ) -0.916* - -0.974* -0.998** -0.857 -1.669*** 
Schooling if ability group 1 (     ) - 0.031 - - - - 
Schooling if ability group 2 (     ) - 0.078** 0.018 - - - 
Schooling if ability group 3 (     ) - 0.128*** 0.051 - - - 
Schooling if ability group 4 (     ) - 0.090** -0.006 - - - 
Ability group 2 (   ) - -0.472 -0.180 -0.010 - - 
Ability group 3 (   ) - -0.919** -0.437 0.132 - - 
Ability group 4 (   ) - -0.377 0.369 0.197* - - 
Constant 0.428** 0.506** 0.576** 0.492** 0.580** 0.379*** 
       
Wald test Ho:         
(p-value) 
(0.518) - (0.729) (0.974) (0.968) (0.244 ) 
       
Number of obs. 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165 594 3,160 
R-squared 0.158 0.164 0.168 0.165 0.158 0.181 
       
Significant at: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*), 15% (°)   
 
    
All regressions control for experience, experience^2, first language, and Lima (capital city). 
Ability groups were built using the quartiles of the cognitive skill distribution. 
Regressions in columns (A) - (D) use data of the random subsample of individuals who answered cognitive tests. Regressions 
in columns (E) and (F) use the subsample of individuals who attended basic education in Lima and outside Lima, 
respectively. 
 
 
  
24 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Estimated returns to basic and higher education /1 
 
 1991 2004 2010 
Schooling (  ) 
0.077** 
[0.045, 0.109] 
0.040** 
[0.036, 0.049] 
0.035** 
[0.028, 0.041] 
Schooling if higher education (    ) 
0.054 
[-0.017, 0.126] 
0.153** 
[0.138, 0.171] 
0.117** 
[0.102, 0.132] 
Higher education (  ) 
-0.694 
[-1.719, 0.331] 
-1.877** 
[-2.121, -1.632] 
-1.370** 
[-1.573, -1.166] 
Constant -0.540** -0.138** 0.176** 
    
Number of obs. 2,737 19,713 23,749 
R-squared 0.07 0.24 0.19 
 
Significant at: 5% (**).  
Brackets show 95% confidence interval. 
/ 1 All regressions control for experience, experience^2, first language, and Lima (capital city). 
Databases used were the ENNIV survey for 1991 and the ENAHO surveys for 2004 and 2010. 
 
 
Simulated wage schedules (log of hourly wages) /1 
 
/1 Using 1991, 2004 and 2010 coefficient estimates reported above. 
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Appendix 2 
 
In columns (B), (C) and (D), ability groups correspond to the quartiles of the grit 
(perseverance) distribution. Columns (A), (E), and (F) are identical to those in Table 1 in 
the main text. 
 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Schooling (  ) 0.037* - 0.028 0.036* 0.062*** 0.033*** 
Schooling if higher education 
(    ) 
0.090** - 0.073* 0.090** 0.078 0.144*** 
Higher education (  ) -0.916* - -0.764 -0.947** -0.857 -1.669*** 
Schooling if grit group 1 (     ) - 0.063*** - - - - 
Schooling if grit group 2 (     ) - 0.051 -0.019 - - - 
Schooling if grit group 3 (     ) - 0.118*** 0.040 - - - 
Schooling if grit group 4 (     ) - 0.131*** 0.050** - - - 
Grit group 2 (   ) - 0.220 0.286 0.067 - - 
Grit group 3 (   ) - -0.494 -0.343 0.105 - - 
Grit group 4 (   ) - -0.653** -0.452 0.130 - - 
Constant 0.428** 0.198 0.468* 0.364* 0.580** 0.379*** 
       
Wald test Ho:         
(p-value) 
(0.518) - (0.684) (0.678) (0.968) (0.244 ) 
       
Number of obs. 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165 594 3,160 
R-squared 0.158 0.161 0.170 0.161 0.158 0.181 
       
Significant at: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*), 15% (°)   
 
    
All regressions control for experience, experience^2, first language, and Lima (capital city). 
Ability groups were built using the quartiles of the grit distribution. 
Regressions in columns (A) - (D) use data of the random subsample of individuals that answered cognitive tests. Regressions 
in columns (E) and (F) use the subsample of individuals who attended basic education in Lima and outside Lima, 
respectively. 
 
